

## D

## PROVISIONAL PROCEDURES TO UPHOLD THE AUTHORITY OF THE 1925 GENEVA PROTOCOL

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* the provisions of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods in Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925,<sup>88</sup> which entered into force on 8 February 1928,

*Noting* that States parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction<sup>89</sup> have reaffirmed their adherence to the principles and objectives of that Protocol and called upon all States to comply with them,

*Noting also* that the Protocol does not provide for the establishment of procedures for investigating reports concerning activities prohibited by the Protocol,

*Noting further* that the Committee on Disarmament is currently engaged in the negotiation of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, which should contain provisions to ensure its effective verification,

*Believing* it conducive to the continued authority of the Protocol that, pending eventual formal arrangements, procedures be established to make possible the prompt and impartial investigation of information concerning possible violations of the provisions of the Protocol,

1. *Calls upon* all States that have not yet done so to accede to the 1925 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare;

2. *Calls upon* all States to comply with the provisions of the Protocol;

3. *Calls upon* the Committee on Disarmament to expedite its negotiations on a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons with a view to its submission to the General Assembly with the shortest possible delay;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to investigate, with the assistance of qualified experts, information that may be brought to his attention by any Member State concerning activities that may constitute a violation of the Protocol or of the relevant rules of customary international law in order to ascertain thereby the facts of the matter, and promptly to report the results of any such investigation to all Member States and to the General Assembly;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General, with the co-operation of Member States, to compile, as a matter of priority, and maintain lists of qualified experts whose services could be made available at short notice to undertake such investigations, and of laboratories with the capability to undertake testing for the presence of agents the use of which is prohibited;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General, in meeting the objectives of paragraph 4 above:

(a) To appoint, as necessary, groups of experts selected from the above-mentioned list to undertake urgent investigation of possible violations;

(b) To make the necessary arrangements for the experts to collect and examine evidence, including on-site, with the co-operation of the countries concerned, to the extent relevant to the investigation, and for such testing as may be required;

(c) To seek, in any such investigation, appropriate assistance and relevant information from all Governments and international organizations concerned, as well as from other appropriate sources;

7. *Further requests* the Secretary-General, with the assistance of qualified consultant experts, to devise procedures for the timely and efficient investigation of information concerning activities that may constitute a violation of the Geneva Protocol or of the relevant rules of customary international law and to assemble and organize systematically documentation relating to the identification of signs and symptoms associated with the use of such agents as a means of facilitating such investigations and the medical treatment that may be required;

8. *Requests* Governments, national and international organizations, as well as scientific and research institutions, to co-operate fully with the Secretary-General in this work;

9. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session on the implementation of the present resolution.

*101st plenary meeting  
13 December 1982*

## E

## CHEMICAL AND BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL) WEAPONS

*The General Assembly,*

*Having considered* the report of the Secretary-General<sup>93</sup> to which was annexed the report of the Group of Experts to Investigate Reports on the Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons, appointed by the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly resolutions 35/144 C of 12 December 1980 and 36/96 C of 9 December 1981,

*Taking note* of the final conclusion of the Group of Experts that, while it could not state that the allegations had been proven, nevertheless it could not disregard the circumstantial evidence suggestive of the possible use of some sort of toxic chemical substance in some instances,<sup>94</sup>

*Recalling* that the use of chemical and biological weapons has been declared incompatible with the accepted norms of civilization,

1. *Takes note* of the report of the Secretary-General and expresses its appreciation to the Group of Experts to Investigate Reports on the Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons for the work it has accomplished, as well as to the Member States that co-operated with the Group in fulfilling its mandate;

2. *Calls anew* for strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare<sup>88</sup> and condemns all actions that are contrary to those objectives.

*101st plenary meeting  
13 December 1982*

**37/99. General and complete disarmament**

## A

## NON-STATIONING OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON THE TERRITORIES OF STATES WHERE THERE ARE NO SUCH WEAPONS AT PRESENT

*The General Assembly,*

*Conscious* that a nuclear war would have devastating consequences for the whole of mankind,

*Recalling* its resolution 33/91 F of 16 December 1978, which contains an appeal to all nuclear-weapon States to

<sup>93</sup> A/37/259.

<sup>94</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 197.